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Article
The global financial crisis at the time of this writing is going 
on for 4 years. Although there have been positive signs that 
the “Great Recession” may be coming to an end, high unem-
ployment, the continued slow progress in the mortgage cri-
sis, and sovereign debt exposure point to continued difficulty 
in keeping banking institutions well capitalized. 
Capitalization allows banks and credit unions to withstand 
minor setbacks and helps keep defenses stronger in case of 
systemic shocks. Given the attempts to redress the financial 
institutions taken by a number of governments and organiza-
tions, threats to bank solvency that were often passed over 
have recently garnered greater attention (e.g., Congressional 
Oversight Panel, 2010, 2011; McKillop, Ward, & Wilson, 
2010; Walter, 2010). Why is it that credit unions received 
much less public support than other institutions in the United 
States? Is this lack of support due to less need, unlike that 
found by Allen Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2012) 
when considering recent developments in Germany, less 
political power, or being considered small enough to fail? 
Some have cited declining ethical standards (Volcker, 2011) 
or internal factors such as excessive compensation for the 
collapse of so many institutions. The threat of out of control 
compensation practices to a healthy financial system is 
severe enough that new guidelines are in the process of being 
formulated by a number of regulatory bodies including the 
Federal Reserve in the United States (2011) and the Bank for 
International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland (2011). Some 
have pointed to the level of pay, and others have focused on 
the incentive schemes that are offered. Financial institutions 
typically have had the highest pay among industries, and at 
least top-level executives have, in many cases, incentive 
compensation based on firm performance. These schemes 
have often been shown to have positive impacts on perfor-
mance in a number of industries. The problem with some of 
these compensation schemes is that they have not been 
adjusted for the risk imposed on the institution. Corporate 
governance issues have been brought to the fore by these 
compensation issues as well. Have the board of directors and 
management given enough attention to the risk that these 
practices place on the institution, or have they been aware of 
the probable consequences and their own personal incentives 
are so short term that future institutional collapse is not a 
consideration? Shareholders as well as taxpayers in a number 
of countries believe that compensation has gone too far and 
have been openly challenging executives at companies like 
Citigroup, Barclays, and Credit Suisse (Schafer, 2012). This 
article will answer some of these questions concerning the 
dangers of mismanaging compensation. Data collected from 
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This article looks at the theory and empirical findings of excessive compensation on the recent financial implosion across 
institutional forms in banking. Compensation levels have gone up dramatically over the last 30 years as deregulation and 
concentration have grown. Some banks and quite a few credit unions avoided closure by prudent portfolio selection and 
keeping reserves up by maintaining compensation levels closer to the median level. Empirical findings here are based on a 
unique panel data set on U.S. commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions from 1994 through 2010 (more than 300,000 
observations) that provide evidence that the firms with the highest net worth typically are smaller institutions, are credit 
unions, have smaller insider loans as a percentage of assets, and have lower average pay levels. The favorable results here 
for credit unions, financial cooperatives, should help guide policy when deciding which type of financial institutions should be 
encouraged.
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1994 to 2010 on U.S. credit unions, banks, and thrifts pro-
vide a rich resource to analyze the changes in capitalization.
The next section will discuss the theory of capitalization 
and compensation as it relates to financial institutions. The 
third section of the article will address the data used and the 
empirical strategy. The results of the statistical analysis will 
be considered in the fourth section followed by the policy 
implications.
Theory of Capitalization and 
Compensation
Capital acts not only to provide financial institutions the 
liquidity necessary to take advantage of opportunities but 
also as an important buffer in case of distressed asset values. 
Historically capital levels were much higher when there was 
no clear lender of last resort. Bank capital in the 1800s typi-
cally ranged from 20% to 50% of assets, much higher than 
the approximately 10% that is seen recently (Dwyer, 2011). 
The higher leverage ratio seen before this recession makes 
institutions more susceptible to even moderate fluctuations 
in assets. The lender of last resort function and the deposit 
insurance programs of the last 100 years also come with cap-
italization standards that are often perceived as burdensome, 
even though well below what existed in the period of “free 
market” banking in earlier years. The different stakeholders 
of institutions often have divergent goals in regard to capital. 
Shareholders interested in maximizing income typically 
want less than the credit rating agencies due to the opportu-
nity costs of maintaining high liquidity than do depositors 
and regulators who want to be protected from loss (Allen, 
2006; Doyran, 2011). Credit unions, unlike commercial 
banks, are financial cooperatives and have depositors who 
are also the claimants on the residual income as well as being 
able to determine the composition of the board of directors 
(Jones, Kalmi, & Kauhanen, 2012). All institutions wishing 
to avoid “prompt corrective action” (PCA) by regulatory 
authorities will attempt to meet the minimum capital stan-
dards for being “well capitalized” set by the relevant regula-
tor (Elizalde & Repullo, 2006).
Compensation practices at financial institutions have 
been controversial especially lately due to the relatively high 
levels of pay and the risks that are thought to have been mag-
nified by incentive compensation schemes. The banking 
industry has one of the highest levels of pay of any industry 
in the United States especially investment banking and even 
after accounting for differences in human capital (Cai & 
Milbourn, 2010; Philippon & Reshef, 2012). Given the 
recent crisis with substantial taxpayer bailouts since 2007 
(Gilbert, Kliesen, Meyer, & Wheelock, 2012), with compen-
sation still quite high, has a number of shareholders and tax-
payers feeling that their money has been misspent and that 
the high pay actually makes default risk higher (Thanassoulis, 
2012). In 2010, compensation at publicly traded banks 
reached a record US$135 billion (Lucchetti & Grocer, 2011). 
Even in the midst of the recession in 2009, these same com-
panies paid US$128 billion in pay. Many argue that many of 
these companies would have been bankrupt and closed if not 
for the infusions from the Fed and the government (Aubuchon 
& Wheelock, 2010; Taibbi, 2011). One of the more discussed 
cases is that of the investment bank of Goldman Sachs 
(2011), which recently paid approximately US$500,000 in 
average compensation. A high percentage of compensation 
among banks, especially among senior management, comes 
from incentive schemes such as bonuses and stock options 
(Rosen, 2002). Incentive schemes such as these are often 
thought to bring increased firm productivity in a wide variety 
of industries (FitzRoy et al., 1998; Klinedinst, 2003; Kruse 
& Blasi, 1997). Although these variable pay schemes are 
often associated with greater efficiency in many industries, it 
is clear in banking that they may also contribute to greater 
risk (Federal Reserve, Board of Governors, 2011). This 
greater risk is a problem that derives not only from senior-
level executives’ compensation but also from employees in 
areas where the desire to earn bonuses in the short run is not 
adequately matched to the long-run implications of their 
decisions (Financial Stability Board, 2012). This agency 
problem of improper incentives runs through institutions all 
the way to the board of directors (Brown, 2009; Group of 30, 
2012). Compensation being at odds with the interests of 
stakeholders was brought to the attention of the mainstream 
economics profession by Berle and Means (1932) in their 
book The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
we are dealing not only with distinct but often opposing groups, 
ownership on the one side, control on the other—a control which 
tends to move further and further away from ownership and 
ultimately to lie in the hands of management itself, a management 
capable of perpetuating its own position. (p. 124)
Robert Hoel (2011) recently pointed out a similar problem in 
credit unions as well,
Owner power evolves as the organization grows in size and 
complexity. Management becomes the most powerful actor in 
governance. (p. 21)
The degree to which this increased power translates into 
more firm earnings ending up in executive compensation 
rather than capital to protect shareholders, customers, and 
regulators is what this article hopes to empirically 
investigate.
Data and Empirical Strategy
Data used here come from publicly available series on all 
credit unions, thrifts, and commercial banks in the United 
States from 1994 until the end of 2010. These annual data are 
relatively unique with more than 322,000 observations 
allowing a comparison of the strengths of various institu-
tional forms through prosperous economic times and into the 
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“Great Recession.” Sources for these online data are the 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA; 2012) and 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC; 2012). 
Statistical methods utilizing not only summary statistics but 
also regression techniques with numerous controls will be 
used to analyze these data. Given that we analyzed data from 
different financial institutional forms that often have similar 
goals and regulatory constraints but are also distinct, we 
allow flexible forms and compare both within and across 
institutions. Operationalizing the relations discussed in the 
previous section gives a general form such as
Yit = + +it itα β εX .  (1)
The performance indicator, Y
it
, used here is the firm’s net 
worth as a percentage of assets. The intercept, α
i
, captures 
firm specific factors which may be otherwise unseen, while 
the X matrix contains policy variables, state dummies, and 
regional and time dummies to capture exogenous contempo-
raneous shocks and policy changes. The use of firm specific 
intercepts helps to eliminate bias due to firm heterogeneity 
from unmeasured factors (e.g., managerial talent, technol-
ogy, market share, etc.). Time invariance of a number of 
policy variables, however, would mean that when using fixed 
effects, these variables’ estimates would be lost. Random 
effects estimation allows these parameters to be recovered. 
Endogeneity of some of the policy variables in the X matrix 
would allow nonspherical error terms; hence, instrumental 
estimates are also calculated (Hausman & Taylor, 1981; Im, 
Kyung, Seung, Schmidt, & Wooldridge, 1999).
The policy variables include dummies for institutional type 
(credit union, thrift, or commercial bank), a dummy for large 
size (“giant” more than US$50 billion in assets), and an inter-
action term for giant firms with average salary per employee, 
national unemployment figures, and the Case–Shiller housing 
index.
Results
All institutional forms have seen a dramatic decline over the 
period from 1994 to 2010. Table 1 shows that credit unions, 
savings banks, and commercial banks dropped from a total 
of almost 25,000 in 1994 to just over 15,000 by 2010, with 
savings bank numbers cut almost in half. This decline in 
numbers, in many cases caused by mergers, is reflected in the 
fact that large institutions (“giants” in the tables), those with 
more than US$50 billion in assets, grew 164% (e.g., Goddard, 
McKillop, & Wilson, 2008; U.S. Senate, 2011; Wilcox & 
Dopico, 2011). This pace quickened from the end of 2007 
until the end of 2010, especially for commercial banks.1 
Capital grew substantially for all institutions over the time 
period, 344% for all institutions as indicated in Table 2. The 
largest growth occurred in commercial banks, second in 
credit unions, and savings banks the least. Large institutions 
also reported strong growth of 270%. As a percentage of 
assets, the growth of capital was less remarkable, but still 
positive over the whole period. Credit union’s net worth ratio 
was relatively stable at around 10%, whereas all other insti-
tutions showed stronger growth at the end of the period to get 
to roughly the level the credit unions had over the entire 
sample. This higher capital ratio2 for credit unions is in part 
a purposeful strategy after the difficult times experienced in 
the 1980s (Dywer, Gould, & Lopez, 1999). The largest insti-
tutions, starting with 6.55% (a result at odds with Daniel 
Bergstresser’s, 2004, work on earlier data), had the farthest 
to go and hence recorded the greatest growth at almost 70%. 
Figure 1 shows that credit unions had a higher median net 
worth over the whole period except for the last year when the 
large banks received substantial government assistance. The 
growth at the giant institutions is not too surprising given the 
largesse of the Federal Reserve to institutions that were “too 
big to fail” (Barofsky, 2012; Blinder & Zandi, 2010; Special 
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
2012; Taibbi, 2013). Insider loans dropped over the period 
for credit unions and commercial banks, but went up by more 
than 200% for savings banks. Credit unions started the period 
with salaries about half those of the largest firms, closing the 
gap partly to about 67% by 2010. Average real salaries grew 
by similar amounts for all institutions over the period, except 
for the giants, which had much higher salaries than the others 
initially. Figure 2 shows that the ranking of median salaries 
over the whole period remains steady with the giants having 
the highest median salaries followed by savings banks, com-
mercial banks, and finally the credit unions. It is interesting 
to note that the firms with more than a billion dollars of 
assets not only had typically higher salaries in 1994 than the 
firms with less than US$50 million in assets, but these large 
firms had a larger growth rates in salaries from 1994 to 2010. 
If the commercial and savings bank employees in 2010 














Total 24,761 20,324 16,798 15,144 −39 −9.9
Credit unions 12,199 10,439 8,267 7,488 −39 −9.4
Savings banks 2,145 1,587 1,250 1,127 −48 −9.8
Commercial banks 10,411 8,298 7,281 6,529 −37 −10.3
Giants (assets above US$50 billion)a 14 28 37 37 164 0
aFirms with more than US$50 billion in assets. There were 494 observations in this group, 56 for savings banks and the rest were for commercial banks.
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(2,083,246 employees) had been paid at the average rate of 
credit union employees, the annual savings from even this 
limited measure of compensation would be more than US$40 
billion. Alternatively, if the compensation in commercial and 
savings banks had been used to hire people at the mean sal-
ary of credit unions, there could have been more than 740,000 
jobs in the industry.
The top and bottom quintiles of all observations ranked 
according to net worth as a percentage of assets are reported in 
Table 3. This table shows that credit unions overall and through-
out the period are more than 70% of the top quintile observa-
tions. The top firms are also typically smaller, averaging 182 
million in assets and only 36 employees versus 1,230 million 
and 225 employees for the bottom quintile. There are about 3 
times as many giant institutions in the bottom than in the top. 
Insider loans are also smaller in the top quintile, and average 
salaries are also lower. It is interesting to note that after trillions 
of dollars were injected into the system after 2007 (Blinder & 
Zandi, 2010), the percentage of commercial banks, savings 
banks, and giants dropped quickly as a percentage of the bot-
tom quintile and the average salary in this quintile continued to 
increase. This finding of those institutions with the highest 
salaries levels continuing to pay well matches the Federal 
Reserve’s finding that “Over the recent three-year period, 









1994-2010 Number in 2010 
Capital (2010 dollars) US$23.4 m US$42.0 m US$104.0 m 344 15,153
 Credit unions US$3.2 m US$6.1 m US$12.4 m 288 7,488
 Savings banks US$51.1 m US$80.1 m US$131.0 m 156 1,127
 Commercial banks US$41.3 m US$79.7 m US$205.0 m 396 6,529
 Giants (assets above US$50 billion) US$7.4 b US$11.9 b US$27.4 b 270 37
Assets (2010 dollars) US$297 m US$486 m US$942 m 217 15,153
 Credit unions US$33 m US$53 m US$124 m 276 7,488
 Savings banks US$649 m US$958 m US$1,100 m  70 1,127
 Commercial banks US$532 m US$939 m US$1,850 m 248 6,529
 Giants (assets above US$50 billion) US$112 b US$154 b US$246 b 120 37
Net worth ratio (capital/assets) 7.90% 8.65% 11.10% 40.41 15,132
 Credit unions 9.57% 11.44% 10.03% 4.83 7,484
 Savings banks 7.39% 8.45% 11.75% 47.98 1,126
 Commercial banks 7.76% 8.49% 11.10% 43.00 6,522
 Giants (assets above US$50 billion) 6.55% 7.70% 11.13% 69.97 37
Insider loans percentage of assets (2010 dollars) 0.74% 0.48% 0.30% −60 15,153
 Credit unions 0.57% 0.48% 0.37% −35 7,488
 Savings banks 0.13% 0.21% 0.42% 223 1,127
 Commercial banks 0.91% 0.53% 0.28% −69 6,529
 Giants (assets above US$50 billion) 0.20% 0.26% 0.08% −60 37
Average salarya (2010 dollars) US$54,549 US$63,955 US$78,922 44.68 14,804
 Credit unions US$41,367 US$48,248 US$59,651 44.20 7,173
 Savings banks US$51,729 US$60,352 US$76,438 47.77 1,123
 Commercial banks US$56,349 US$66,213 US$81,523 44.67 6,508
 Giants (assets above US$50 billion) US$80,358 US$78,200 US$89,283 11.11 37
Firms with more than a billion dollars in assets
Average salary (2010 dollars) US$59,882 US$68,887 US$84,263 40.72 832
 Credit unions US$45,325 US$54,523 US$67,103 48.05 169
 Savings banks US$52,571 US$60,771 US$81,630 55.28 156
 Commercial banks US$61,239 US$70,266 US$85,296 39.29 507
Firms with less than US$50 million in assets
Average salary (2010 dollars) US$40,949 US$45,471 US$51,250 25.15 6,045
 Credit unions US$37,235 US$41,539 US$47,581 27.79 4,966
 Savings banks US$53,415 US$69,148 US$80,982 51.61 136
 Commercial banks US$43,983 US$49,753 US$57,212 30.08 943
Note. m = million; b = billion.
aA number of outliers were deleted here, mainly due to the fact that some credit unions operate with only volunteers.
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median net worth decreased for all income groups except the 
top decile, for which it was basically unchanged . . .” (Bricker 
et al., 2012, p. 6).
Tables 4 and 5 give results based on either the savings 
banks as the control dummy or the commercial bank dummy 
and with increasing numbers of control variables included. 
Regressions with the most controls in these two tables, col-
umn 4, were found to be the best fit.3 In both tables, credit 
unions are estimated to have a positive and significant impact 
on net worth. The difference between savings banks and 
commercial banks is often insignificant with savings banks 
in the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates showing a posi-
tive and significant impact. Given the power and size of large 
institutions, a “giant” dummy, which includes a number of 
institutions that are typically considered too big to fail and 
often hard to measure precise effects (Berger et al., 2012), 
shows a positive and significant effect on net worth. It is 
interesting to note that if the giant dummy is included with-
out the interaction term for salaries, it becomes negative and 
significant (see column 2 of Table 5). This interaction term is 
significant and negative indicating high salaries at these 
giant institutions detract from the positive scale effect and 
may be above efficiency wage norms.4
The negative and significant coefficient on salaries gives 
some credence to the hypothesis that insiders, executives, 
may be paid at such a rate that shareholders suffer. Loans to 
insiders are also measured to have an important negative 
impact on net worth in both Tables 4 and 5. It might be 
Figure 1. Net worth, 1994-2010 (median).
Figure 2. Salary per employee (median, 2010 dollars).
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argued that average pay may vary over the business cycle; 
hence, regressions with employment held constant were per-
formed, not reported here, and show similar results. The 
national unemployment rate is also measured, as might be 
expected, as having a negative and significant impact on net 
worth. The Case–Shiller housing index throughout these two 
tables is seen as being positively correlated with net worth. 
The unemployment and housing index capture in part the 
impact on bank balance sheets of the recently reported drop 
of almost 40% in the median net worth of American house-
holds of the last few years of this sample (Bricker et al., 
2012).
Tables 6 to 8 allow the effects to be institutional specific 
and broken down into different asset sizes. Estimating the 
impact on credit unions alone in Table 6 shows that the 
impact of salaries and insider loans to typically be not sig-
nificant. Commercial banks estimated in Table 7 again shows 
the positive scale effects of the “giants” but their high sala-
ries have a negative influence on net worth. Even among the 
large firms, there are differences across institutional forms, 
for example, Navy Federal Credit Union, the largest credit 
union with assets of more than US$44 billion in 2010, had 
16% higher net worth ratio than the large commercial bank 
Goldman Sachs ([.09744 − .08357] / .08357 = .16596), and 
Goldman paid on average about 26% more in average sala-
ries ([97,158.97 − 76,787.951] / 76,787.951 = .2653). Note 
that this calculation is for 2010 after Goldman received sub-
stantial funds from the government and this does not include 
incentive payments that were not reported as salaries by 
Goldman to the FDIC.5 Although salaries are more often car-
rying the expected negative sign, they are only significant in 
two asset groups. Loans to insiders in all asset groups for 
commercial banks are estimated to be negative and signifi-
cant. The savings bank results in Table 8 mirror more closely 
the commercial banks than the credit unions, for example, 
the “giants” impact is similar and the loans to insiders all 
have the expected negative sign.
The decision of what to pay and whether to make a loan to 
an insider could be considered contemporaneous choice vari-
ables of the firm, hence simultaneously determined with the 
dependent variable. Table 9 shows the Hausman–Taylor 
model in column 1 which accounts for this potential endog-
eniety, which is indicated by the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test, 
and allows for time-invariant variables.6 Columns 2 to 4 in 
Table 3. Means in Top and Bottom Quintiles According to Net Worth.
All years 1994 2000 2007 2010
Top quintile (66,163 observations)
 Net worth ratio (capital/assets) 21.7% 20.0% 20.2% 24.4% 18.8%
  Credit unions, percentage of observations in top 
quintile
72.6% 72.9% 74.6% 70.2% 72.9%
  Savings banks, percentage of observations in top 
quintile
6.2% 6.2% 5.7% 6.5% 7.3%
  Commercial banks, percentage of observations in top 
quintile
21.2% 20.9% 19.7% 23.4% 19.8%
  Giants (assets above US$50 billion) 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3%
 Capital (2010 dollars) US$39.5 m US$8.9 m US$14.5 m US$59.7 m US$94.6 m
 Assets (2010 dollars) US$182 m US$44.3 m US$71.9 m US$245 m US$504 m
 Insider loans, percentage of assets 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1%
 Average salary (2010 dollars) US$66,097 US$51,232 US$61,385 US$63,919 US$81,285
 Employees  36 14 22 44 65
 National unemployment 5.4% 6.1% 3.9% 4.6% 9.6%
 Case–Shiller housing index 125.4 78.2 108.1 170.8 130.9
Bottom quintile (66,163 observations)
 Net worth ratio (capital/assets) 7.1% 6.7% 6.8% 7.7% 7.4%
  Credit unions, percentage of observations in top quintile 31.7% 39.8% 24.3% 20.6% 46.3%
  Savings banks, percentage of observations in top quintile 11.0% 11.0% 11.5% 11.7% 7.6%
  Commercial, percentage of observations in top quintile 57.3% 49.2% 64.2% 67.7% 46.1%
  Giants (assets above US$50 billion) 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.2%
 Capital (2010 dollars) US$86.8 m US$42.3 m US$86.7 m US$261.0 m US$77.7 m
 Assets (2010 dollars) US$1,230 m US$632.0 m US$1,280 m US$3,390 m US$1,060 m
 Insider loans, percentage of assets 0.4% 0.7% 0.5% 0.2% 0.3%
 Average salary (2010 dollars) US$70,426 US$57,929 US$67,451 US$84,623 US$87,989
Employees 225 153 239 452 155
 National unemployment 5.5% 6.1% 3.9% 4.6% 9.6%
 Case–Shiller housing index 113.1 78.2 108.1 170.8 130.9

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9 are estimated in first differences to show robustness 
of the results in the presence of possible unit roots, which 
was found not to be the case with augmented Dickey–Fuller 
tests.7 The results in Table 9 show similar levels and signifi-
cance to those found in Tables 4 and 5.
Policy Implications
The results here point to pay levels at large institutions being 
high enough to have a negative impact on firm capital levels. 
These calculations are made even though the data here prob-
ably capture a fraction of the real expenditures that might be 
considered part of internal compensation, especially for 
executives at larger firms.8 It is interesting to note that the 
institutions that received the smallest amount of assistance 
from the government, credit unions, also have had consis-
tently high levels of net worth and also pay employees the 
least. The high levels of pay seen in the largest institutions 
not only are correlated over the whole period with lower net 
worth but continued once the “Great Recession” forced tax-
payers to help recapitalize what otherwise probably would 
have been bankrupt firms. Section 956 of the Dodd–Frank 
Act that addresses excessive and misaligned compensation 
has been codified by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, but 
their oversight may not always be sufficient without public 
and congressional pressure. A number of studies have shown 
high wages in many industries are related to firm size, educa-
tion, and union militancy among other factors. Although we 
were not able to control for all of these factors within this 
industry, we did control for a number of elements, including, 
for example, size, region, insider loans, year, and institu-
tional form, and find that credit unions with all else held con-
stant kept higher reserves to handle a possible downturn 
rather than distributing earnings to highly paid executives. 
The results reported here also are a reflection of the senti-
ment of large numbers of U.S. consumers who are transfer-
ring their savings to credit unions (Cole, 2012; Gelles, 2011; 
Worth, Hampel, & Schenk, 2012). Nevertheless, even these 
limited data show a negative correlation with pay, net worth, 
and insider loans. Large firms not only pay more, in line with 
the hypothesis from Berle and Means (1932), but their pay 
has risen at a faster pace than the smaller institutions. Over 
the time period of this study, this excess pay relative to the 
institutions that did not get bailed out at taxpayer expense 
adds up to hundreds of billions of dollars. These billions 
could have been given to shareholders or helped prevent pos-
sibly the bailouts given by the general public. Recapitalization 
of financial institutions is a major concern across the globe, 
and the attempt to maintain solvency by requiring sensible 
compensation seems to be one of the tools that may help.
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Notes
1. This could be partly attributable to the numerous “bailout” 
programs of the Federal Reserve, which committed close to 
US$12 trillion (Blinder & Zandi, 2010).
2. Also called the net worth ratio is the institution’s assets minus 
liabilities over total assets.
3. For example, in Table 4, χ2 of 15,549 with 49 df and a p value 
of .00.
4. It is interesting that when interacting credit unions with aver-
age salaries, the term is positive and significant.
5. In 2007, before the bailouts, Navy Federal Credit Union’s net 
worth ratio was 22% higher than Goldman’s, and Goldman 
Sachs also paid average salaries that were 37% higher than 
Navy’s.
6. χ2 of 987.97 with 3 df and a p value of .00.
7. Asymptotic χ2 from a Fisher-type unit-root test of 266.97 and 
a p value of .00.
8. The items not captured by the publicly available data used 
here include such expenses as executive office spaces, planes, 
deferred compensation, hidden expenses in “research,” and so 
on. The salary reported by Goldman Sachs to the Fed for 2010 
was US$220 million versus the US$15,376 million reported 
in the 2010 Annual Report (220 / 153760 = 0.014). A similar 
result holds for Bank of America in 2010, that is, US$18.1 bil-
lion reported to the Fed and the annual report lists US$35.1 
billion (18066 / 35149 = 0.51).
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